Thursday, March 17, 2011

Excerpts from Simon Vratsian

Simon Vratzian, Hayasdani Hanrabedutiune [The Republic of Armenia], Paris, 1928, pp. 8-10

P. 8
…As it is evident there is no enthusiasm toward the Reform Project or diplomatic actions in that regard. The [ARF 8th] World Congress instead stressed confiding on the Armenian people and the Party [ARF] and to continue internal organizational efforts.
The agenda points were not yet concluded when the news of the war in Europe reached the congress. The war in itself had created an extraordinary commotion within Turkish governmental circles, whose first action, as it was anticipated, was to let go of the Armenian Reform Project all together. The General Inspector, Hoff left Van quickly. A general mobilization was announced throughout Turkey and preparations started everywhere for the war. Turkey was feverishly preparing for the war.
Regarding this general Turkish attitude and taking into consideration the incredulous viewpoint of the Turkish authorities [toward Armenians in general], towards the ARF World Congress shortened its agenda and started examining the possibility of Turkey entering the war. In this regard, the meeting decided to inform its organs and members throughout Turkey to remain faithful and loyal toward the state and to dully perform their civil duties. At the same time, the World Congress elected a seven member special committee, which was to tackle all issues if the war started. [1] As a general decision, the congress also determined that the party had to firmly persuade Turkey to remain neutral, arguing that Turkey’s participation in the war would not only be destructive for the Armenians, but also for the Ottoman Empire in general.  
The ARF General Congress had ended when the CUP delegates Behaeddin Shakir and Naci bey reached Erzerum. They had brought with them several scores of Caucasian and Persian Azeri agents. Their aim was to organize an anti-Russian propaganda campaign and struggle in the Caucassus and Northern Persia. Their program entailed a total mobilization of the eastern provinces. They were also authorized to open negotiations with the ARF General Congress in the hope of creating a united front against Russia.
The Ittihad delegates proposed to the ARF representatives to let the Dashnaktsutiun unite with the Turks during the ensuing Russo-Turkish war. This was to be accomplished through a general Armenian rebellion in Caucasian Armenia. They insisted that the Georgians and the Caucasian Turks had already given their decision in this regard and were organizing for a general rebellion of their own. Indeed, the Caucasian Turks who had come to Erzerum with the Ittihadist delegates did assure us that they were on their way to their Caucasian locales to start the organization of such a rebellion and, in the case the war started, to create disturbances in the rear of the Russian army with the aim to disorganize and to demoralize that army.
Behaeddin Shakir and Naci bey considered the time ripe for the Caucasian peoples to topple the Russian yoke.

P. 9
According to them, Turkey had no intention of occupying the Caucasus. All it wanted was to create an autonomous state their under its auspicies, so that it could act as a bulwark between the Ottoman and the Russian empires. They were particulary precise in their announcement that they were eager to create an autonomous Armenia on landmass comprising Russian as well as Ottoman Armenian provinces. They were also careful in their utterances that in case Armenians didn’t unite with them that would bring about utter consequences.   
The ARF representatives stated that in their view it would be best if Turkey didn’t enter the war at all, since they were convinced that the final victory would be for the Allied powers. In such a case, a Turkey participating in the war [on the side of the Central powers] would lose dearly. They clarified that Turkey’s interests were best preserved if the country remained neutral. A neutral Turkey would gain much more than a belligerent Turkey. To go to war in such conditions meant throwing the country into a venturesome quagmire…
The Ittihad delegates were adamant in their stance. The issue of war was already decided for them. For them missing such an opportunity was tantamount to guilt, since no such opportunity would repeat itself in terms of getting rid of their age old enemy, Russia. German victory was not an issue of doubt for them. Moreover, a victorious Germany undoubtedly meant a victorious Turkey. They wanted to persuade Armenians to join hands with them and fight against a common enemy. However, the ARF leaders stated that, if, contrary to their will, Turkey enters the war, the ARF organs and members in Turkey would complete all their civil duties toward their state. As to the matter of Caucasian Armenians, the ARF in Turkey could not decide on their behalf and motivate them to rebel. This was especially so, since in the last five years the Turkish authorities didn’t utilized an inviting policy toward Western Armenians, which, in turn, would have served as a catalyst to attract Eastern Armenians to their side…
This, of course, was not the answer that the Ittihad delegates awaited. They wanted more tangible proofs of “Ottoman patriotism.” This demand was in itself confusing, since relations between the ARF and the Turkish authorities had cooled off tremendously on the wake of the latter’s futile maneuvers toward the Armenian Reform Project in general. Armenians could not offer more, since that was a psychological and emotional impossibility. The ARF was not only unable to motivate Eastern Armenians to rebel against the Russians; it was perhaps even unable to stimulate any patriotism within the Western Armenians toward the Ottoman Empire…If anything, this was a clear indication of how much the Turkish regime was discredited in the eyes of the Armenian people…
On the contrary, it was more possible to assume that there would be an explosion of anti-Turkish sentiments within Armenians in case war erupted.  That was exactly what happened. The Russo-Turkish war hadn’t started yet, when a strong—more precisely a spontaneous-- wave of Armenian volunteering for the Russian cause mushroomed. This gave birth to the Armenian volunteer units in the Caucasus, where Armenians from all wakes of life participated wholeheartedly.

P. 10
Four volunteer regiments were formed in a very short time. The number of those who wanted to participate in those regiments was four times the number that was required…
          




[1] Notice the difference in the number of members of the committee. Minakhorian states it was composed of nine mebers.

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