Vahan Papazian, “Hamashkharhayin Baderazmuh yev Daroni Ashkharhuh,” [The World War and the Region of Daron] Vem, 3:3 (Jul.-Aug., 1935), 3-9.
In the spring of 1914, the Ottoman Parliament was on vacation. The central club of the CUP had turned into a center for the government’s leadership; there was too much commotion there.
Of course it was natural for us to understand the daily developments, and the disposition and thoughts of the ruling circles.
The Patriarchate’s governing bodies did not give the same importance on keeping such relations or penetrating the curtains of the ruling class.
The members of the Ottoman Parliament were more capable to keep in close contact with the Turkish ruling circles. While the ARF’s secret machinery had certain means to penetrate their [CUP] clubs.
The political atmosphere and inclinations were often made clear in the “Cercle d’Orient” political club, where, besides the Turkish governmental and political leadership, international diplomats passed the time. Zohrab[1] (and Halajian I believe) was members of such a club. He began going there more often. Garo[2] and Vartkes[3] kept in contact with the ministers, while a few of the other deputies did so with the other CUP officials.
All the information received was summarized at the top floor of the Azadamard[4] editorial offices where the ARF Bureau was located. It was there that they were organized, conclusions were extracted (of course if possible) and future steps were decided.
It was at this time that the Turks, one after the other, would bow to take an active role in the war. Ambitions were unleashed to, on the one hand, the sweet picture of recapturing the lost Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Balkans lands, and, on the other hand, becoming the ruler of the beautiful Caucasus and securing a bulwark against the Russian nightmare. Even unofficial negotiations and ‘deals’ were being completed on this basis….
At that time, the decisions of the ARF Eighth World Congress (about Turkey and the war) appeared to already be known to the Turkish leaders. Naci and Behaeddin Shakir had already met with our comrades in Erzerum. Talât had already made Garo understand that he was dissatisfied with the ARF’s passive stance, adding that they were free to derive the necessary conclusions from that.
From the first day of the announcement of the war, both our important members in Erzeroum and we in Constantinople did everything to try to counter the Turks’ increasingly belligerent dispositions. Although they were trying to be sure of us, but their proposal to us in Erzeroum[5] left no doubt that they were going to go to war against Russia.
Armenians of Constantinople plunged into despair…
Armenia Bureau Constantinople Section decided…
On that occasion, the Bureau invited its membership to a lengthy consultation to clarify the current political situation and especially to stress the inclination of the leadership of the Constantinople Bureau’s region regarding what positions should be taken by Turkish-- and Caucasian--Armenians, assuming that the World Congress had been unable to determine such positions.
Invited to those sessions, besides our important comrades (Shahrigian, Khajag, Hratch, Armen Garo, Vartkes, Pashayan,[6] Mar,[7] Sarkis Minasian,[8] Sarkis Parseghian, etc.) was Zohrab. Unfortunately, it is impossible for me, after all these years and experiences, to recall individual member’s opinions about the situation […] I only remember the gloomy events, the worried eyes and my comrade’s pale faces with the awareness of their awful responsibilities in that room.
I remember well that there was a general belief that the Turks were throwing themselves into the chaos of war without cause [motive]. By the same token, we had an internal conviction that they would take the Germans’ side to even their score with the Russians…. In this instance, we found before us a tough issue—how would we extract ourselves from this terrifying choice, which is nothing else but having to decide between two extremes. The Russian-Armenians were going to fight in the Russian army and naturally would happily lead that army towards the Promised Land—the Turkish-Armenian lands. While we were obliged to join the Turkish army, not just as soldiers, the Turks would undoubtedly demand from us that we neutralize operations of the Russian-Armenian soldiers and freedom fighters [irregulars] and would even expect extraordinary services (about which they had already spoken in Erzerum).
And what can be said about the opposite circumstance? We were also conscious of that, of course not to the extent and horror to which it would occur. We expected ruthless persecution against the Turkish-Armenian irregular forces and intellectuals, only that.
Zohrab was the most pessimistic and deeply overcome. He had lost his usual liveliness. He was extremely worried and disturbed. He spoke of the final burial of the reforms […]. “If Turkey joins Russia’s enemies, it will take its revenge out on us for these years of revolution and also for the Armenian Cause…” he muttered, almost to himself, sitting next to me. And when others, especially Khajag,[9] were speaking of Russia’s formidable strength and how it could quickly deal a deathblow to the Turks, Zohrab, who only knew the Russians from history and in Constantinople, was seized for a moment by the assurances. But then Shahrigian[10] came and disturbed his soul’s peace. To this day I cannot think of that great man’s psychological misery without deep emotion.
As far as I can remember, there were two positions. The first was that from the first day of a Russo-Turkish war, the Russians would inflict a lightening quick crushing blow on the Turks. In that case, there had to be ready in the Caucasus regiments of Armenian volunteers. They would, as an advance guard, quickly capture the important strategic points in Armenia, not allowing Turkish or Kurdish elements to harm the Armenian population.[11] But that had to cultivate [advance] our political demands and be introduced to the Russian authorities through the Catholicos. Our political desires were the independence of Turkish Armenia under Russian protection. At the same time, the Armenian Bureau had to order its organizations in the provinces to secretly prepare for self-defense. But in a moment of peril (in case of emergency) unite with the invading Armenian regiments.
This position was defended by Khajag, and to a degree by Armen Garo, Sarkis and Dr. Pashayan.
The second position was more conservative. Its proponents were more pessimistic about the chances of a rapid Russian advance given the weakness of Russian commanders in the Caucasus and the large number of troops that would be needed on other fronts. In their opinion, the dangers for the Turkish-Armenian population were inescapable. Though the order for self-defense had to be given, but it was also essential to assemble some large Armenian fedayeei groups at a few points near the borders in the Caucasus. They should remain in reserve and only cross the border in an extreme circumstance such as a massacre of the Armenian population or a complete defeat of the Ottoman forces.
They thought it would be detrimental to organize any kind of volunteer units and thereby completely subordinate themselves to the Russian army. Besides, not provoking the Ottomans against the Armenians, the defenders of this position believed that they had to forewarn the Turkish leaders to think twice about taking any steps by announcing that the Armenians on the other side of the border would not move from their places if the Armenian population inside were not threatened with physical danger. Otherwise, the forces gathered on the borders could easily enter the country along secret routes and harass the Turkish forces from the rear and flanks, create internal anarchy, and assassinate Kurdish bandit elements. This position was defended by S. Minasian, Hratch, Vartkes, Shahrigian, and I, and later by Zohrab.
The two opposing positions remained irreconcilable. It was decided to submit the two positions to the examination of the central committees and, at the same time to the Eastern Bureau (Caucasus) via myself while expecting the return of the World Congress delegates so that, if needed, they could reexamine the issue.
However, in the meantime, all were in agreement, that Turkish-Armenians had to honestly undertake their civic responsibilities as citizens and undertake the sacrifices demanded of them including enlistment in the army, special war taxes, etc.
Live was peaceful in Trabizond…
August 14 I moved towards Batum…
We reached Tiflis, it was in turmoil…On the other hand, Turkish-Armenian and Russian-Armenian youth were banging on the ARF’s door. They were demanding that the ARF go public and take charge of organizing the volunteer regiments. The most active among them was Hamazasp,[12] who had just arrived from the [ARF] World Congress. He was particularly animated (enlivened) and impelled to claim the leadership of the volunteer movement. I concluded, therefore, that for the Armenians living in the Caucasus joining the fighting in volunteer regiments was natural and beyond reproach. They saw the opportunity to extract vengeance on the Turks and, especially, to liberate our lands.
This was the general situation that eventually also affected the upper levels of the Armenians. They were speaking about sending a delegation to St. Petersburg to present our political demands. I believe that Duma member M. Babajanian was working in that direction there.
Coming to the leadership of our ARF regions, I found them in an equivocating and disturbed condition. The delegates to the World Congress had already returned. Therefore, they already knew from their reports the World Congress decisions and the CUP proposals. At the same time, there was moral pressure being applied from all sides to decide positively on the issue of volunteer regiments and to assume leadership of their organization. If I’m not mistaken, one of the future commanders, Antranig,[13] had already been summoned by telegram.
This was the atmosphere when I reached Tiflis. We had a series of vitally important meetings with the broad circle of ARF leadership.
I remember meetings at Dr. Zavriev’s sister’s home…My report about the Armenian Bureau, Constantinople Section’s views was examined at length, with deep seriousness, and from many sides. For me, however, it was already clear, that among the comrades in Tiflis the preponderant view from the beginning was in favor of participating in volunteer regiments in the Russian Army. The excited demonstrations and public meetings by the masses making demands for our ranks and our military figures had affected them. They thought that it was not possible neglect that ardent movement and leave the dispositions of the ranks to fate where they could fall into dire straits or turn into tools of the Russian commanders. They were drafting a number of stipulations for the regiments to be formed and demands (the authority of the regimental commanders, their subordination to the National Assembly, and the defense of the Turkish-Armenians). They also had in mind the issue of the liberation of Turkish Armenia. The Czar must solemnly announce that. Dr. Zavriev[14] was to leave for St. Petersburg with that goal.
I became informed during the debate and from the discussions that in Tiflis that all currents (parties) had formed a National Bureau (except the Social Democrats I believe), and still our guys wanted to leave the work of organizing and leading the volunteers to him. They already had in mind the commanders for the regiments and had already invited them.
I was in agreement with the second view of the comrades in Constantinople, to have prepared forces but not to become tied to the Russian Army, to remain in a reserve position, but to bring out our forces in the extreme or a favorable moment. We discussed and debated this issue at length. The Tiflis comrades were already too substantially thrusted into active participation to be convinced otherwise by arguments by me or by those I brought from our Constantinople comrades.
Limitless faith and spirit reigned over all classes of Caucasian Armenians. Faith towards Russian forces, certainty that the Russians would finally guide the Armenians to their bright stage, certainty that the Russian Army in every way and without reservation will encourage and assist the Armenian volunteer regiments.
As things went forward, the likelihood of a Russo-Turkish War increased. We had to hurry as the borders could be closed.
I went directly to Igdir…
[1] Krikor Zohrab. Member of parliament from Constantinople, a noted jurist and Writer
[2] Karekin Bastermajian, AKA Armen Karo
[3] Vartkes Serengulian Effendi, Member of Ottoman Parliament from Erzerum
[4] ARF Daily newspaper offices and the ARF Center for Constantinople
[5] To take an active role in the Caucasus by creating conspiratorial organizations (a fifth column) behind the Russian army.
[9] Karekin Khajag, AKA Karekin Chakalian.
[10] ???
[11] On this matter it was proposed to immediately negotiate with the Russian government, getting their agreement and receiving the necessary military assistance.
[12] Hamazasp, AKA Hamo Beknazaryan, ARF leader and one of the leaders of the Van Resistance of 1915.
[14] Hagop Zavriev was a graduate of the St. Petersburg Medical Academy. He later joined the ARF. The viceroy of the Caucasus consulted him over the formation of the Armenian volunteer units in 1914.
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